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-vs.-
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REP·L Y BRIEF O~F AP·PELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case, as well as the law applicable
thereto, are fully discussed in plaintiffs' opening brief.
Plaintiffs do not feel that a reply brief is necessary
insofar as the material issues are concerned. However,
defendant's answering brief, in attempting to torture
plaintiff Jon Larson's testimony into some semblance of
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a defense, is repleat with mis-statements of both law and
fact which, if not corrected, might prejudice plaintiffs'
case.
For the convenience of the court we therefore indicate such mis-statements and respectfully urge the court
to examine the record of these proceedings.
The defendant would have this court believe that
the plaintiffs' brief excluded the testimony of Jon Larson. (Page 1 of defendant's brief). Quite to the contrary,
the plaintiffs' brief contained every pertinent portion of
his testimony that is contained in the defendant's brief,
including his statements relative to the location of both
vehicles when he first saw defendant's automobile, his
speed, his failure to recall applying his brakes, and the
length of time he observed defendant's headlights.
(Pages 4-5 of plaintiffs' original brief).
The defendant contends that the testimony of the
plaintiff driver is inconsistent in that he stated he saw
defendant's headlights for two seconds and yet testified,
to the best of his knowledge, that he did not recall seeing
the defendant's automobile until he was entering the
intersection. The former testimony is fully consistent
with the undisputed physical evidence in the case which
indicated skid marks and reaction distance totaling 73
feet from the point of impact thereby placing the Larson
vehicle some distance south of the intersection at the
time that observation of danger by the plaintiff driver
resulted in his taking defensive measures to avoid col2
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lision. ( R. 419-420). Likewise, Jon Larson's testimony
that he did not see the defendant's automobile until he
was entering the intersection is absolutely consistent
with the undisputed physical evidence relating to the
existence of a dense :five- or six-foot hedge which extended along the south side of Evergreen Avenue to its
intersection with 23rd East. (R.121, 127,422, 136-137, 175,
366-367 and Exhibit P-1). Thus, in view of the defendant's own testimony that he did not see the plaintiff's
automobile until both cars were in the intersection (R.
118, 121) because of the existence of said hedge and the
testimony of the defendant's passenger to the same
effect (R. 365-366), it is absolutely clear that Jon Larson's testimony is consistent with the only physical
possibility under the circumstances. Jon Larson's testimony, when viewed in light of the undisputed physical
evidence, indicates an unusual degree of consistency,
frankness and honesty rather than being frought with
deceit as defendant alleges.
With respect to the income of Jon Larson, which is
completely immaterial to this appeal, the defendant
would have the court believe that the witness willfully
misrepresented his income as being $1,000 per month at
the time his deposition was taken but then testified at
the trial that his income was only $500 per month and
that his previous statement was an exaggeration. (Page
4 of defendant's brief). The facts are much different than
they are represented by defendant. Mr. Larson testified
on direct examination that he received a monthly salary
of $500 plus override and commissions amounting to
3
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or more, which would have to be established more
accurately by his bookkeeper. (R. 194). On cross-examination he declared that the figure given in his deposition
was correct to the best of his ability to estimate at that
time, and any variance between that figure and the actual amount of his income was an ''unintentional exaggeration" on his part. (R. 202-204). Certainly, no willful
misrepresentation can be conjured from such testimony.

$300

Again on page 5 of defendant's brief it is represented
that Officer Gunn testified that there was no hedge, that
his measurement began from the corner of the house and
not the hedge as previously represented by plaintiffs.
The defendant then cites page 121 of the Record on
Appeal to sustain his statements. That page is entirely
devoted to the testimony of the defendant and has no
bearing on the matters raised. The pure fabrication of
the statements made by the defendant in his brief can
be shown by quoting the record itself. At pages 126-127
thereof, Officer Gunn testified as follo·ws:
'' Q. Yes. In that regard, Officer, perhaps I can
call your attention to \Yhat has been marked as
Exhibit 1-P and draw your attention specifically
to the north-south street which is designated on
the diagram as 23rd East and the street which is
defined here as running from east to west and
west to east described as EYer green A venue 1
''A. Uh huh.
'' Q. Are you familiar with such an intersection?
''A. Yes, I am.
4
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'' Q. Would this be the same intersection in
question'?
''A. Yes.
'' Q. Officer Gunn, would you please state for
the benefit of the jury, are you familiar with this
particular intersection~
''A. Yes, I am.

"Q. Would you say that this diagram as it is
drawn fairly represents the area in question~
''A. Yes, it does, it is exactly it.
'' Q. Now going back to my previous question,
Officer, would you please state for the benefit of
the jury what did your physical investigation of
the area determine~
''A. Well, on the southeast corner on the Evergreen side there was a hedge and shrubs.

"Q. could you ...
''A. About approximately . . .
'' Q. Could you point these things

out~

''A. About four to five feet tall about right in
here.
'' Q. Does that description on the diagram
fairly well represent that .
''A. Yes, it does.

"Q .... row of
"A. Yes."

shrubs~

In view of the fact that the hedge had been removed
at the time of the trial, Officer Gunn testified as follows
at pages 421-422 of the Record on Appeal:
'' Q. Did you stand in that street on the night
of the accident~
''A. Yes, I did.

5
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"Q. On the night of the accident was that
hedge there~
''A. Yes, it was.
'' Q. Could you describe the hedge~
''A. The hedge was of a regular hedge variety,
approximately four to five feet tall. I didn't measure the exact height but it was pretty well up.

"Q. State whether or not you could see
through it~
''A. No, you couldn't.
'' Q. Was it a very dense hedge~
''A. It was a regular thick hedge.''

With respect to the measurement of skid marks and
reaction time by Officer Gunn, he testified as follows, at
page 420 of the Record on Appeal:
'' Q. Then would it be fair to say that he was
first apprised of danger and acted to do something about it 73 feet back from the point of
impact~

"A. That's right. Now this 33 feet, we mean
that is a thinking time it takes to get the foot off
the throttle or wherever it was onto the brake.

"Q. And that was the average reasonable
man~

"A. That's right, 33 feet.

"Q. Were you able to determine on your diagram what point that would be in relation to this
intersection~

''A. Yes.

"Q. Could you show it there on the diagram)!
''A. We measured back 40 feet jr01n the point
of impact which we determined by the land ma.rk
we set first and that would brin.g it down to 13
6
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feet 8 inches sot£th of the south mark of the hedge,
or the hedge mark and the pole here; 13 feet 8
inches south of this obstruction here."
(Emphasis added).

The misrepresentation of the actual facts by the defendant is clearly apparent from the above. The only
statement by Officer Gunn as to the absence of said hedge
had reference to the time of the trial after said hedge
had been removed and not to the conditions prevailing
at the time of the accident. (R. 420).
Again the defendant would have this court believe
that the defendant observed the plaintiff's automobile
to be 50 feet away as the defendant entered the intersection, and attempts to sustain this fact through the statement of Officer Gunn that the defendant so stated to him
on the night of the accident. (R. 125-126). BUT defendant fails to advise the court of his own statements upon
the subject to the effect that, because of the existence of
the hedge, he did not see the Larson vehicle until it was
toward the front of him. (R. 121). Likewise, his own
passenger testified that both cars were in the intersection before she noticed danger. (R. 365). It is apparent
that defendant's counsel has attempted to attribute statements to his client which the defendant, himself, has
refuted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED
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IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JO~
LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO
THE JURY.
PoiNT

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN
PAGES 27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE
430 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL.

POINT

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
POINT

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 FOR THE REASON THAT
IT WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

PoiNT

V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUSTAINED BY THE
EVIDENCE, AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF JON
LARSON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO
THE JURY.
rrhe defendant's argument under Point I consists
of an attempt to prove excessive speed and failure to
keep a proper lookout on the part of the plaintiff driver
but does not cite any authority contrary to that set forth
in plaintiffs' original brief. Defendant apparently takes
the position that the plaintiffs were required to establish
the speed limit upon 23rd East in order to prove the
defendant's defense of contributory negligence. (See
page 4 of defendant's brief). The defendant attempts to
establish the speed limit at 25 miles per hour as being
within a residential area. (See page 9 of defendant's
brief). The plain truth of the matter is that said street
is, and was, posted for a 35-mile-per-hour limit, and in
the absence of proof of the speed limit thereon, the only
applicable speed limit available for consideration is that
of 50 miles per hour, unless this court will take judicial
notice of the posted speed limit. In the absence of such
an evidentiary guide to assist the jury it was clearly error
for the lower court to allow the jury to speculate as to
whether the Larson vehicle was being driven at an excessiYe or unreasonable speed. See Olsen. v. W arwood,
123 U. 111, 255 P. 2d 725; Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16,
9
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268 P. 2d 986; and other cases cited in plaintiffs' original
brief at pages 15-19 thereof.
With respect to speed and the maintenance of proper
lookout, the defendant cites cases holding that whether
speed or failure to keep a proper lookout is the proximate cause of an accident is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. But the defendant fails to take
into consideration the requirement that there must be
substantial evidence of speed or improper lookout such
as would constitute negligence before the question of
proximate cause is even called into issue. The record in
this case does not disclose any such evidence. As pointed
out hereinabove, and in plaintiffs' previous brief, the undisputed physical evidence in the record, i. e., skid marks,
reaction time, and the existence of the hedge in relation
to the intersection involved, completely rules out any
inferenee of improper lookout on the part of the plaintiff driver. And even if his statements concerning the
location of his automobile at the time he first saw defendant's automobile were considered as evidenee of improper
lookout, rather than evidence in support of the undisputed physical facts as above explained, such evidence
would still be insufficient, as a matter of law, under the
rule laid down in Haarstrich v. Oregon Short LineR. Co.,
70 U. 552, 262 P. 101, that testimony which is contrary to
uncontroverted physical facts DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The defendant also alleges, without any reference to
any evidence whatsoever, that Jon Larson did not have
10
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eontrol enough to swerYc his car to the opposite side of
the road to avoid the accident. (Page 10 of defendant's
brief). Jon Larson testified that he did cramp his wheels
to the left to avoid the accident. (R. 171, 200, 202). And
the defendant himself testified that attempts were made
by both cars to avoid the accident. (R. 116). In addition
the defendant admitted that the accident was due to his
own fault. (R. 124, 404). Certainly, if the plaintiff driver
had been traveling at an excessive speed with no control over his automobile in addition to maintaining an improper lookout, the defendant would have so indicated
rather than assume full responsibility for the accident as
he did. The above evidence, when viewed in connection
with the undisputed physical evidence relating to skid
marks, reaction time and visual impediments, absolutely
negates any inference of lack of control on the part of
the plaintiff driver. Certainly such evidence does not
constitute substantial evidence or a preponderance of
the evidence in favor of such a finding. The authorities
heretofore cited with respect to permitting a jury to
speculate upon evidence or to base findings of fact upon
surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation, are fully
applicable in this regard.
Thus, as pointed out in plaintiffs' original brief, the
lower court erred in submitting the question of the plaintiff driver's contributory negligence to the jury for the
follo\ving reasons: (1) There is no evidence in the record upon which to base such a finding; (2) there is no
substantial evidence upon which to base such a finding as
a matter of law; (3) there is no preponderance of evi11
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dence upon which to base such a finding ; (4) reasonable
minds could not differ upon the evidence in this case as
to the exercise of due care by the plaintiff driver; ( 5) it
allowed the jury to speculate upon evidence which was
not substantial in nature; (6) it allowed the jury to base
a finding of fact on surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation; (7) the only evidence upon which such a finding
could have been made was as consistent, and even more
so, with the absence of negligence than with its existence;
and (8) it left to the jury the power to "hold that negligence might be inferred from any state of facts whatever." The defendant's brief has failed to provide any
law contradictory to the above. It necessarily follows that
each and every aspect of the claimed contributory negligence which was submitted to the jury was not supported by the evidence, as a matter of law, and, therefore,
the court erred in submitting the special interrogatories
contained in Instruction No. 17 to the jury. Likewise, the
verdict and judgment were not sustained by the evidence
as a matter of law.
PoiNT

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS SET FORTH IN
PAGES 27, 30 AND 31 OF THE RECORD ON
APPEAL AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT SET FORTH ON PAGE
430 OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL.
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth
under Point I and for the reasons therein set forth urge
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this court to set aside the verdict and judgment of the
lower court and order said court to grant the plaintiffs a
new trial solely for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount of damages suffered by each individual plaintiff
and that the lower court enter judgment for plaintiffs
in accordance with such findings.

PoiNT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiffs incorporate herein the argument set forth
under Points I, IV and V.
PoiNT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS
INSTRUCTION NO.3 FOR THE REASON THAT
IT WRONGFULLY UNITED AN INSTRUCTION
UPON THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PLAINTIFF JON LARSON WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The defendant cites the holding in Toone v. J. P.
O'Neill Construction Comparny,. 40 U. 265, 121 P. 10, as
authority for the proposition that a court may instruct
on unrelated propositions in the same instruction. A cursory examination of the quoted portion of said case in
defendant's brief will conclusively show the incorrectness
of that contention. In the Toone ca.se, this court held that
an instruction in accordance with the appellant's evidence
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and in accordance with the respondent's evidence upon
the same proposition is proper. That case was properly
cited in plaintiffs' original brief and the defendant has
wrongfully charged the plaintiffs with citing the case
inaccurately in his brief. The court can easily determine
the source of the inaccuracy upon this point.
The defendant has completely failed to justify the
giving of Instruction No. 3 by the lower court, which
united an instruction upon the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff driver with an instruction that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. Such instruction clearly constitutes reversible error even in the
absence of reversal under Points I, II, and III.

PorNT V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY.
Plaintiffs reincorporate the argument set forth in
their previous brief under POINT V. The defendant
argues that the inclusion of the questioned instruction in
J. I. F. U. necessarily precludes any question as to its
proper application under the facts of this case. Again
plaintiffs reiterate that said instruction, as it related to
this case, allowed the jury to reconsider the negligence
of the defendant which had already been determined as
a matter of law by the lower court, and, in the absence
of limiting said instruction to the claimed contributory
negligence of the plaintiff driver, the lower court committed reversible error for the reason that the effect of
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such instruction upon the jury is not capable of ascertainment. The giving of instructions that permit the redetermination of the existence of negligence by a jury
upon facts which have been determined negligent as a
matter of law by the court constitutes reversible error.
Jlorrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. 2d 772.

CONCLUSION
It is indeed a strange appellate procedure which
leads the defendant to attack the veracity and truthfulness of plaintiff Jon Larson's testimony with such
vehemence as that employed by the defendant in his brief
and then rest his entire case upon the testimony of that
plaintiff which defendant claims is contrary to the undisputed physical evidence of the case. An examination of
the transcript clearly reveals that, contrary to defend-

ant's assertions, said plaintiff's testimony sustains the
uncontroverted physical facts of this case rather than
being in conflict therewith. Such an analysis is to be favored in vie''T of the rule of this court that testimony which
is contrary to uncontroverted physical facts does not constitute substantial evidence.

Under such rule, even if

Jon Larson's testimony was found to be in conflict with
the undisputed physical evidence, it would be insufficient
to sustain the verdict of the jury. The absence of any
substantial evidence relating to improper lookout, speed
and control of the automobile driven by Jon Larson requires the reversal of the verdict and judgment of the
15
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lower court. In addition thereto the giving of instructions No. 3 and No. 8 by the trial court constituted
reversible error.

Respectfully submitted,

DONN E. CASSITY,
JAMES L. BARKER, JR.,
JACK L. CRELLIN,
Attorneys for Appellants
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